JUDEA AND SAMARIA
RESEARCH STUDIES
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Introduction

The central plenum session at the twenty second convention of research on Judea and Samaria in the year 2012 was dedicated to the memory and life’s work of former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, marking 100 years since his birth and 20 years since his death. The session was sponsored by the Begin Heritage Center and moderated by Mr. Herzl Makov, director of the Begin Heritage Center. The speakers referred to Begin’s personality, his political approach concerning Judea and Samaria, his attitude toward granting autonomy to the Arabs in the occupied territories - and his part in promoting settlement plans.

Prof. Haim Gvirtzman, chairman of the Water Authority, opened the conference with his lecture on "The Israeli - Palestinian Water Dispute," in which he introduced the complexity of the water problems in the area and value of a quantitative and detailed overview of the water supply to Israelis and Palestinians.

This was the fourth consecutive year in which the results from the 'Index on public opinion on West Bank settlement' were presented, examining the general Israeli public's views on settlements and the settlers in Judea and Samaria. This compilation will provide, among others, the research data presented in the index and we will discuss their implications, compared to the findings of previous indices.

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The 22nd compilation of Judea and Samaria Studies is published at a time of considerable instability in the region. U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to the area did not break the deadlock in the peace process with the Palestinian Authority. Once again, the security problems in Israel focused this year on the southern region, especially the Gaza Strip and the adjacent communities. Three rounds of rockets were launched from Gaza into Israel in the past year, hitting cities such as Ashdod and Be’er Sheva. If in the past rockets falling on these cities were considered an extreme escalation in the conflict-ridden region, today it is a matter of chronological routine. Not to mention the continuous 'trickle' of rockets and mortar shells fired at communities in the northern Negev. A change was noted at the Gaza front in November 2012, during Operation Pillar of Defense, but the results of this military operation remain unclear: On the one hand, it calmed the hostilities along the Gaza border for
the first time in years, while on the other hand, it is a fragile ceasefire which is still occasionally broken. Terrorist activities of groups affiliated with Al-Qaida have increased in the Sinai Peninsula, and Eilat has become a regular target for rocket attacks. Meanwhile, along the northern border, the civil war continues in Syria. Though the rebels have succeeded in territorial gains and have taken over large parts of Syria in the past year, their main objective of toppling President Assad’s government has not been met, true to the time of writing these lines.

On the domestic front, the recent elections dramatically altered the political map in Israel. The Likud Party remains in power, and Benjamin Netanyahu has remained Prime Minister, however the government is shared with other parties, including Habait HaYehudi and Yesh Atid - both rival ideological parties, who managed to create a united front and to dictate conditions to the ruling party in the process of forming a governing coalition. The social discourse in Israel has focused in the last year on the social protest more that the political stalemate with the Palestinians. Even the discussion deliberating whether to unilaterally attack Iran or not, has gradually been removed from the headlines during the recent year.

The State of Israel, including Judea and Samaria, seems like an island of stability. Despite the serious concerns, the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas failed to gather enough votes to win UN recognition of a Palestinian State. The security situation is relatively reasonable, construction continues in Samaria and the general feeling is one of political stability in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which recently went through a political crisis after the resignation of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.

Former Ariel Mayor Ron Nachman passed away after a serious illness and received a special honor after his death – The Israel Prize for lifetime achievement. Among the committee’s reasons for the award the fact that he "saw the settlement and development of Israel as a supreme value."

In July 2012, the Higher Education Council (Judea and Samaria) decided to make Ariel University Center one of the eighth official universities in Israel - Ariel University. In December the same year, Central Command confirmed the decision. The institution was established in 1992 as the College of Judea and Samaria, under the auspices of Bar Ilan University, and continued to operate independently after 2005. The recognition process succeeded due to the diligent efforts made by the university management, board members, the Executive Committee, faculty and friends of the university both in the government and around the world. We would like to extend a special thanks to Prof. Dan Meyerstein, for the 17 years he presided as president of the university. Prof. Meyerstein finished his term after completing the task he
set out to complete – that of turning small academic institution into a large university with over 14,000 students enrolled for the current academic year (2013-2012).

Prof. Meyerstein also served as chairman of the research and development center of Samaria and the Jordan Valley, and thus contributed to the promotion and development of regional research. We wish to congratulate Professor Yehuda Danon on his new position as president of Ariel University and Samaria & Jordan Rift R&D Center Chairman in the region.

***

Many articles reached the editor's desk, each one underwent an initial assessment by the editors of each sub-area of research and meticulous judgment by two experts reading on the subject under examination. Eventually, only about half of them were accepted for publication in this compilation. Three titles representing different disciplines are included in this compilation: under the first title are studies that concentrate on the Bible, archeology and history. The second title is a research collection on the subject of culture, society and politics, and the third title includes research studies in the areas of environment, nature and agriculture. Together they paint a picture that reflects various levels of the characteristics of the region and work done in the past and present.

We would like to thank all those who assisted us from the beginning of the process: members of the committee of the compilation system, to the many referees who read the articles, whose comments contributed greatly to the scientific level of the compilation. Thanks also to those who due to them, we achieved this finished product: To Shoshi Heisler, Coordinating Editor and Copy Editor, who invested her time and efforts into the work with generosity, efficiency and precision. Thanks to. Zehava Waldman and Shlomit Dinner, the graphic designers, and to Old City Printers. Thanks also to Orit Natan and Shunamit Wolberg, Secretaries of R&D, for their dedicated assistance with everything.

Miriam Billig
Regional Director of Samaria & Jordan Rift R&D Center

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SUMMARIES

PART ONE:
BIBLE, HISTORY AND
ARCHAEOLOGY

The Northern Boundary of Ephraim - A New Geographic Explanation for the Separate Cities in Light of the Findings of Archaeological Surveys

Aharon Tavger and Netanel Elonson

In the description of the territories of the tribes in the book of Joshua, a simple boundary is described between the territories of Ephraim and Manasseh, which descends from Tapuach along the Kana Stream. In spite of that, the detailed description of the existence of separate cities belonging to Ephraim, inside the territory of Manasseh, presented a problem in understanding on which side of Kana Stream these cities are located, and who possesses the territory in which they are located. In the past, scholars were forced to distort Biblical verses or to assume an historical change in the boundary during the Iron Age, but their explanations are not satisfactory.

In this article I will propose a new interpretation of the verses, based on the distribution of the sites of the Mount Ephraim survey, without changing the verses or separating them into different chronological periods. In our view, the verses can be divided into two parts that provide a precise description of the actual geographical boundary line. The first part is the section from Tapuach up to where it meets the Kana Stream, north of which the separate cities are located. In this area, sites were found that could be identified with these cities. The second part is the section along the Kana Stream up to the sea, along which there are no separate cities.

This boundary is consistent with the geological boundary of the region. The separate cities are located at the southern end of the Shechem Syncline, where the land is more conducive to settlement, and the cities are delineated
by a clear topographical border – the Kana Stream. South of these cities is Mount Ephraim, at the northern end of the Ramallah Anticline, a thickly forested region. These geographical data accord with the biblical description of the difficulty of settlement in the forested region of Mount Ephraim, and the data from the surveys concerning early Israelite settlement in the mountains. The first stage of settlement was concentrated in the area of the Samarian Desert, and gradually spread to the area of the Shechem Syncline, which is more conducive to settlement. During this period the Ephraimites lived in the territory of Manasseh, and the separate cities were created. Only during the second stage, after deforestation, did the Ephraimites begin to settle on their own territory in Mount Ephraim.

The Conflict between Abimelech, Son of the Concubine from Shechem, and His Seventy Brothers from Ofra

Yisca Zimran

This paper explores the connection between the story of Abimelech’s relationship with his brothers (Judges 8:29-9:21), and the ‘sibling rivalry’ biblical genre. It also examines how the orientation of the family contributes to formulating the story’s attitude to the concept of kingship. Furthermore, it will briefly depict the characteristics and importance of this literary genre, and how it helps us to understand a single story.

We employ Form Criticism, which seeks to define and include texts based on thematic, structural, and stylistic similarities, and categorize them into literary genres, taking into account conceptual and research developments in Form Criticism as well as the research tools of New Criticism, which emphasizes the formulation of texts and links the writing method to the content. Accordingly, this paper will analyze details of the plot which clarify the subject, the point of view from which the story is told, the basic worldviews upon which it rests, and the unique perceptions that are expressed in it. It will define the relationship between the details of the plot and those plot elements which define the ‘sibling rivalry’ genre, and the implications of the story for the concept of kingship.

We demonstrate that Judges 8:29-9:21 matches the characteristics of the genre of sibling rivalry but applies them in its own unique fashion. Its inclusion in this genre is therefore fully justified. This conclusion is based on the subject of the story, its emphases, the characteristics of its personalities, and the structure of its plot. Furthermore, it will become clear from this paper that the categorization of the story contributes to understanding the plot, its
development and details, and clarifies the basic concepts expressed therein. Against this backdrop, the paper will formulate the attitude towards family and kingship portrayed in the story, and how they complement one another.

**A Farmstead Cave at Abu Dis and its Installations as Part of the Industrial Belt Surrounding Jerusalem**

**Dalit Regev and Lior Shapira**

The cave, excavated in 2009, is located on the eastern slope of Mt. Scopus in El-'Azariya, 1.75 kms east of Jerusalem. Based on the installations and finds from this cave, it is clear that it served a farmstead built above, which has not survived due to intense building activity in the modern neighborhood. The cave was used for a variety of functions including storage, shelter, industry, cooking and bathing.

The cave was constructed in the Iron Age II and was in use during the Persian, Hellenistic and Early Roman periods. It includes the following components: a Jewish ritual bath, columbarium, oil-press, storage and work zone and a water cistern. Finds from the cave include Iron Age and Hellenistic period stamped handles, oil lamps, many stone work tools and large amount of pottery dated from the Iron Age II to the Early Roman period.

The site is located in a farmland region, part of a belt of agricultural sites that encircled Jerusalem, its urban center. During the 8th and 7th centuries BCE, hundreds of settlements surrounded the city, most of them farmsteads. This is clearly the result of the extensive growth of Jerusalem during this time and the need to feed its inhabitants and visitors. This belt of settlements shrunk considerably during the Babylonian and Persian periods and regained momentum only beginning during the Hellenistic period in the 3rd century, and mainly from the 2nd century BCE onwards. These settlements, including our excavation at Abu Dis, were deserted or destroyed during the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE.

**Burial in Natural Caves during the First Temple Period in Light of Finds from El Khadr**

**Yuval Baruch and Alexander Wiegmann**

An Iron Age II burial cave excavated near the village of El Khadr contained a homogenous ceramic assemblage of approximately 200 vessels and a small amount of bronze alloy jewelry, as well as the remains of at least 10 individuals. The finds are dated to the period between the 8th century BCE and
the early 6th century BCE. The cave was part of a large burial ground which contained around 20 additional burial caves, and was in use from the Late Iron Age II to the Early Roman period.

Whereas practically all of the known burial caves in Judea during Iron Age II are rock-hewn caves, the type of burial represented here, a natural karstic cavern which was transformed into a burial cave through the building of a number of architectural features, is exceedingly rare in the archaeological record and has yet to receive sufficient attention in archaeological research. The floor of the cave was leveled by the means of an artificial fill, the opening was blocked by a stone wall with a narrow entrance and a dromos was built outside of the cave. A stone-built stairwell descended into the burial chamber, inside of which benches and possibly a repository were also built of stone.

This type of burial can be interpreted either as reflecting burial practices different from those practiced by the population which buried in rock-hewn caves, or as an imitation of a rock-hewn burial cave by a group which did not have the means or the know how to construct a rock-hewn cave. It is likely that the type of burial represented here was much more widespread than what is reflected in the archaeological record. Several Iron Age II burial caves with built elements and burials in natural caverns are known in Judea and in Transjordan.

‘Pochereth of Zebaim?’ (Ezra II:57, Nehemia VII:59): The Nethinim and the Children of Solomon’s Servants in Tsoba

Yehuda Ziv

Mount Tsoba, being a perfect dome, captures the eye of the viewer. Its Biblical name, the home of Ig’alben ben Nathan (IISam XXIII:36), one of David’s mighty men, derives from the Hebrew root צבה =swell. Pochereth of Zebaim or Zobaim may well be the pottery [= Aramaic ‘Po’heret’>Arabic ‘Fākhura’/فاخورة], installations operated nearby since King Hezekiah’s days by ‘the Netinim [servants of the Temple] and the children of Solomon’s servants’ Ezra II: 58). In the Byzantine era, this pottery cave installation became a baptistery, named after St. John. When the Moslems arrived here, the name Zoba was still in use and became Suba, which means ‘heap; dome-like clay oven’ in Arabic too (صوبة).

Saladin demolished the Crusaders castle in Suba named Belmont (1191), and resettled it with his family’s subjects, brought here from Khirbat er-Rabbah (Rabbat Moab) - near Karak (Qir-Moav). The ‘Mesha Stelle’ mentions
an Israelite cult-place, which had been established there, called ‘David’s ’Ari-‘El’ – the source of Rabbat-Moab’s later name Areopolis. Were those new settlers of Suba descendants of the Netinim and the children of Solomon’s servants mentioned above? Those Moabites were still living there in 1948.

The Benjamin Lowlands from the Second Temple Period until the Bar-Kokhba Revolt
Evgeny Aharonovich

Khirbet Abu ed-Dinein (map ref. 15375/14805) is located on the eastern margins of the Benjamin Lowlands, in the heart of an area characterized by rocky hills of hard limestone, and spans an area of approximately four dunam. A Jewish settlement was established there during the 2nd century BCE, and should be viewed as part of the general settlement trend in the Land of Benjamin at this time, taking place in light of Jerusalem’s increased importance. The site seems to have thrived throughout the 1st century CE until its abandonment during the Bar- Kokhba Revolt which put an end to Jewish settlements in the region. In the 4th century a new, smaller settlement was established on its ruins. This settlement was abandoned during the 6th century.

In 2004–2005 a salvage excavation was undertaken at the site by the Staff Officer of Archaeology—Judea and Samaria, uncovering the remains of a small village with a well-planned bloc of structures at its center. Each of these structures comprised a central unit flanked by a large courtyard, and at times by an additional wing. Of particular note is a structure (IV) containing numerous ashlars and various architectural elements in secondary use, such as fragments of cornices and of columns. Such a concentration of architectural elements points to the possibility of a public structure—perhaps a synagogue—having once stood at the site or in its environs during the Second Temple period.

The excavation revealed the following picture of four distinct areas within the site:

1. Animal herding area: Structures I and III, possibly also IIb
2. Public/administrative area: Structure IIa
3. Dwellings: Structures IV–VII, located in the center of the site
4. Industrial area: Numerous water cisterns and subterranean installations in the southern part of the site

These remains shed new light on rural architecture during the Second Temple period, both of private dwellings and of entire villages.
Muntar Mufya: A Fortress from the Second Temple Period in the Jordan Valley

Yuval Peleg

Muntar Mufya is the name of a high hill that dominates the surrounding area west of the settlement Hemdat in the northern Jordan Valley. The site’s name includes the name of the nearby ruin - Khirbet Mufya. Between 2004 and 2012 the site was excavated by the Staff Officer of Archaeology. The site is a small fortress dated to the first century CE.

On the top of the hill is a single structure with a square tower at the north and a central courtyard to the south surrounded by rooms on the east, south and west. The site's water source is a single cistern located about 50 m northwest of the building.

The excavation revealed that the bottom floor of the tower was filled with earth and large stones and served as the foundation of the upper story. Access to the second floor was by a wide staircase built in the northern part of the courtyard, next to the southern wall of the tower. Adjacent to the staircase is also a tabun (stove).

The rooms around the courtyard are mostly small and narrow. One of the interesting things found in the excavation is that a pottery jug and lamo were found in almost every room in a corner. In addition, other pottery vessels, coins and small artifacts were discovered during the excavations.

Comparing the Qumran Archaeozoology Findings with the Jerusalem City Dump Remains

Ram Bouchnick

There are comprehensive studies of the animal bones buried in the clay plain in the Qumran plateau. These studies reveal a unique phenomenon which gained much attention among scholars of Qumran and the Dead Sea Scrolls. Excavators working at Qumran noted that at the site and its vicinity were many concentrations of animal bones buried along with concentrations of ash and fragments of pots and jars. This is one of the unique characteristics of the activities of the residents of Qumran during the late Second Temple period.

This paper reviews the animal bones found during the excavations of 2002 – 2008 at Qumran. The excavation was directed by Randall Price, Liberty University, Virginia, and Oren Gutfeld, The Hebrew University. Finds were discovered dating to the end of the Second Temple period from 100 BCE until 68 CE. The finds include cooking facilities, food jars and several landfill
concentrations of animal bones, some of which were buried in clay cooking pots. Study of animal remains revealed new information about the consumption patterns of meat and slaughter practices introduced in the Late Second Temple period. It was found that the residents of Qumran enjoyed eating kosher meat, both domestic and non-domestic. They also preserved patterns of systematic slaughter and butchering.

In an attempt to discover the ethnic identity and affiliation of the residents of Qumran, we also examined and compared the Qumran results with the Kidron city dump discovered in Jerusalem. The comparison indicates differences in the composition of the animals in both assemblages. The variety of edible animals in the Jerusalem city dump is richer and contains both birds and fish, while in Qumran there is a negligible incidence of birds and no fish remains. It is important to note that no unclean animal bones were discovered in Qumran and the Jerusalem ratio was almost zero. It seems that this is important evidence of Jewish cultural ethnicity of the inhabitants of Qumran.

Thus the unique phenomenon of burying animal remains after consumption revealed that pottery vessels in Qumran can't be interpreted in the following manner: 1. As sacrifices due to the finding of wild kosher animals. 2. Random burial to prevent nuisance from predatory animals found in the desert or alternatively land reclamation since there is evidence of intentional burial.

Also discovered were several burials near the surface or near residences which were not much in need for improving soil. The absolute absence of pig remains from Qumran is consistent with the theory that Roman garrison troops were not. It seems that the remains of kosher animals discovered in Qumran plain pottery are unique evidence of systematic burial of the remains of meals by Qumran residents of the Late Second Temple period.

Horvat Burgin: A Settlement in the Judean Shephelah from Second Temple Period until the Ottoman Period

Alon Klein, Amir Ganor, Peter Gendelman, Eitan Klein and Boaz Zissu

Horvat Burgin (Khirbet Umm Burj) occupies the summit of a hill in the Judean Shephelah.

The article presents the results of archaeological fieldwork undertaken by the authors from 1995 to 2012, but concentrates on the results of the excavations conducted during 2011-2012. Most of the features discussed had been plundered.

The article presents for the first time new material as:

• The stratigraphy revealed in a probing excavation of a residential area.
• The excavation of two Byzantine churches close to the site’s summit (Area B).
• The relationship between the residential area and the hiding system hewn underneath it;
• A Jewish inscription incised on a doorjamb of an underground room in the system;
• This information enables a fresh overview of the history of the site during the Roman and Byzantine periods, and a discussion of its possible historical-geographical identification as the Second Temple period village of Kefar Bish (Καφαραβίς).

Hadassah in Hebron 1919-1936

Yoram Elmkias

Hadassah, was founded on March 3, 1912 in New York by a group of women led by Henrietta Szold. The organization was founded then during Purim and named after Queen Esther or Hadassah. The stated purpose of the organization was “encouraging Jewish institutions and enterprises and strengthening the Land of Israel in Jewish ideals”. The theme chosen was "The Healing of the Daughter of My People. Two main goals were established: health and training of nurses in Israel, and the implementation of Zionist values.

A branch was opened in Hebron in 1919. There were a number of motives for this decision, including bringing new doctors to the community and integrating them into the community.

We can learn much from the reports of doctors there, including those who came as replacements for doctors on vacation.

“Jerusalem – Har-el surrounds you” – Commemoration of the Harel Brigade in the Jerusalem “Corridor” and in Judaea.

Israel Rozenson and Yossi Spanier

The Har-El Brigade of the Palmach was formed on April 16th 1948 and participated in the War of Independence from the start. It fought mostly in Jerusalem and its environs and suffered many casualties.

The commemoration of Har-el was complicated. The geographic – cultural design of the memorial evolves from differences of concept between the military and political branches regarding the most appropriate way to commemorate Har-El.
Over the years there have been attempts to apply the name of Har-El to the hills leading to Jerusalem and the road leading into Jerusalem. This trend was reinforced during the Six Day War as well as during the commemoration of Yitzchak Rabin at the 60th anniversary of the independence of the State. The Har-El brigade returned to its former battle fields of 1948 and completed what they had begun then.

One can view a memorial on the way to Jerusalem whose design spans two generations. In reality this memorial is comprised of many specific smaller memorials: statues, a special cemetery for the fallen of the brigade, the name of a large intersection, names of streets and neighborhoods, nature reserves and geographic objects. The process of commemoration has been much influenced by literary texts and novels which have been written about the area in question and about the Har-El Brigade.

**Populating the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem's Old City, 1967 – 1969**

*Bracha Slae*

The subject of this paper is the initial, non-traditional method of population of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem from 1967-1969. With the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, official government policy was to rebuild its destroyed and desecrated synagogues and yeshivot and to restore the quarter's traditional Jewish holy sites. Erecting new institutions was not part of the plan. At that time, there was as yet no organized Jewish population in the Old City. However, a rigid planning framework aimed at achieving a heterogeneous, upscale Jewish population had already begun to be formulated. If that is so, how can the founding of two new institutions, Yeshivat HaKotel and Nachal Moriah, in the summer of 1967, be explained?

There were political considerations involved, of course, but decisive factors also included the urgent security and national need for a Jewish population in the Jewish Quarter, one which could withstand the almost inhuman, potentially dangerous conditions of that time. This brought about the creation of new settlement models, that of the Torah institution cum settlement and the urban industrial Nahal outpost. Both these institutions were formed of highly motivated idealistic youth in a supportive and resilient social framework, able to perform defensive roles if the need arose. Both of these institutions were unique to their time and place.

The concept of erecting a Yeshiva as the nucleus of a pioneering settlement later served as a model for settlements in other parts of the country,
particularly in those over the Green Line. Research methods employed here are those of historical geography, and include use of primary sources such as archives, photographs, periodic literature, relevant publications, and oral communications of key players during the first years of rebuilding the Jewish Quarter.

**Golda Meir’s Attitude to the Territories Conquered during the Six Day War**

*Yossi Goldstein*

This article seeks to clarify the attitude of Golda Meir to the territories conquered during the Six Day War. It is based on the thesis that Golda Meir had a negative attitude to the Palestinians and the Arab states. Since she arrived in Palestine, during the early 1920’s, to her dying day, she believed that the Arabs wanted to destroy the State of Israel and Zionism. They refused to recognize the right of Jews to a state in the Middle East. She did not change her opinion throughout the entire period that she held public office.

Golda Meir was secular and did not believe in the right of Jews to the land, due to their past history and their religious beliefs. She resented the ideology of "Eretz Israel Ha-shlema". She believed, especially after the Holocaust, that the Jews can exist only in their own country. Territories occupied in the Six Day War were her "iron curtain". They prevent the occupation of the country by Arab states. For this reason, she did not believe Sadat when he claimed that he wanted peace, when he promised to sign a peace treaty with Israel in exchange for the return of all the territories occupied in the Six Day War. Even mediation headed by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who understood the Egyptian intentions, did not convince her.

She was aware that Sadat threatened another war against Israel unless Israel withdrew from the territories but this did not change her position. She did not believe him and was convinced that Israel won the war imposed on it. So we can say with certainty, that she was guilty of the Yom Kippur War. She could not believe the Egyptian peace offer and refused to withdraw from territories occupied in the Six Day War.

**Rabbi Goren’s Position on Territories for Peace**

*Shifra Mishlov*

Rabbi Goren was the Chief Rabbi of the IDF and the Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel. Among the issues which were central in his world outlook was the
settlement of Israel. Rabbi Goren played an active role in the Six Day War as Chief Rabbi of the IDF, and was among the first to command territories which were captured in the war. Later he supported Gush Emunim, and provided halachic guidance and practical support to the settlers. While serving as Chief Rabbi of Israel, negotiations concerning the status of the "territories" placed him in somewhat of a conflict. On the one hand he strongly opposed handing over sanctified territories of Israel as part of a peace treaty. On the other hand he saw great value in maintaining a good relationship with the political leadership in order to influence the Jewish image of the country, and did not want to upset this relationship. As a consequence, his position on the sanctity of the occupied territories was complex. The object of this research is to study this conflict and the complexity of Rabbi Goren's stand on this issue. Our central hypothesis is that his stand on the government decisions concerning peace treaties in exchange for territories, underwent changes, during and after his serving as Chief Rabbi, in accordance with the halachic status of the various territories and the changes in his public position.

In order to examine his philosophic and halachic views, we examine his writings, speeches, and letters.

We propose that unlike the leaders of Gush Emunim, who opposed any handing over of territories for peace, Rav Goren supported handing over territories which are halachically less holy than Eretz Yisrael proper; e.g., the Golan and parts of Sinai. He strongly opposed handing over those territories which were, in his opinion, in the sanctified area of Eretz Yisrael, such as Judaea, Samaria and the Rafah corridor. This view is opposed to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef who supported yielding territories in order to save lives. In addition, Rabbi Goren's opposition to handing over territories became more severe when he no longer held a public position.
PART TWO: CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS

The Student Village as a Tool for Developing a Sense of "Ideological Rootedness": A Comparative Inter-Regional Study in Israel

Asaf Lebovitz and Miriam Billig

Professional literature focuses on student concentrations in neighborhoods and districts adjacent to universities and their implications on the local population, on students and environmental development. These studies focus mainly on dispossession and exclusion of marginalized populations from the available student dormitories and neighborhoods. These living arrangements around which the academic research focuses are not ideological and cater mostly to the student's basic needs, such as affordable housing and access to the university. They are also always limited to the individual's period of studies. Over the last decade, a new housing solution for students has begun to develop in Israel, called a "Student Village." This is a unique Israeli innovation; a format that is still unknown in the world and it is designed to house students in the periphery. These student villages are unparalleled in the sense that they pose ideological challenges to the students who live in them, on a national, local, communal and personal level.

We claim that these student villages play an important role in shaping and developing a sense of "ideological rootedness", by creating obligations and responsibilities for the student towards the peripheral region in which he or she is living, as well as creating a willingness to remain living there after finishing one's study. We propose a model suggesting that this goal will be achieved if the students' village will be based on the following two principles: Shaping the student's sense of satisfaction of place, based on responding to the student's personal and material needs, such as satisfaction with the group and its social life, quality of life, accessibility to studies and to employment, as well as satisfaction with an ability of self accomplishment, both academically and economically. The second principle focuses on the unique aspects of values and ideology, and their fulfillment in the student's village. It is based
upon developing an individual's sense of community and pride towards the village by belonging to a specific ideological group. Furthermore, his or her social contribution to the place and its population and their contribution to the development of the periphery by continuing to live in the region, would be part of a wider ideological achievement.

**The Hilltop Youth: A Hybrid of Cross Generational Resistance**

*Shimi Friedman*

This article examines the characteristics, ideology and practices of the Hilltop Youth of Judea and Samaria. The main focus of this research is a group of teenagers which in addition to the maturation process of its members, begins to form an ideological system and cultural practices, as part of a maturation ritual for the teenagers. The separation stage, namely the actual leaving of the parent’s home, involves mental detachment, and has brought the teenagers to marginal spaces which for them become the center of their lives. Their routine time exemplifies how a spontaneous gathering and an unsystematic organization of teenagers becomes a comfortable ground for the creation of an ideology and a subculture on behalf of the teenagers. Using this space, they design an ideological world for them and for local society.

It has been found that among the teenagers there are many that are actually not a second generation of settlers, as one could have expected and as has been claimed in earlier papers. This paper shows how the teenagers come from a wide heterogenic spectrum of cities and populations, and from a wide spectrum of religious views. Regarding the reasons of their moving to these spaces, I have found that their motive to settle in that hilltop is not the desire to fulfill a Zionist-settler ideology, or on account of attitudes towards "official" authorities like the army and the police, but the result of coincidence and dire necessity. The teenagers abandoned social normative frameworks of family and school, and searching for an alternative future, as a shelter, food and also a warm community. Their exposure to political and national conflict spaces is the dominant force in the development of their subcultures. Their working hours were they found a convenient place to stay, become a way to establish a social-political ideology against the surrounding Palestinians as well as against the settler community, the founders of the settlements.

Eliav Taub

This paper analyzes the decisions of three governments in power before, during and after the withdrawal from Gush Katif, including the final agreement between the settlers and the government in 2011. We found major differences between the decisions of the governments. The first two governments, those of Sharon and Olmert, were more focused on completing the mission and less on taking care of the settlers. This is in contrast to the Netanyahu government, whose focus was on the settlers' needs and demands. We characterize Sharon's government as not responsive to the demands of the settlers. The decisions of Olmert's government are characterized as more responsive to the public's demands. The decisions of the Netanyahu government are characterized as the most responsive. A commission of inquiry was established after the Olmert government finished its rule.

Based on the above, we conclude that before starting evacuation of settlements, the government should adopt flexible models that include measures of the quality of public services offered to settlers evacuated and the extent to which they meet reasonable criteria of efficiency.

PART THREE: ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL SCIENCES AND AGRICULTURE

The Longest Limestone Caves in Israel

Boaz Langford and Amos Frumkin

In spite of its small size, the Land of Israel is rich with caves in most of its rock formations and regions. The most common ones are karstic caves in limestone.

In 1983 a list of Israel's longest caves appeared in 'Niqrot Zurim', the Journal of the Cave Research Center of Israel. The present updated list includes several newly discovered long caves and discusses other breakthroughs and
developments. Another aspect is technical improvement to reach previously inaccessible underground sites. This type of breakthrough led to the discovery of the southern section of Abud Cave in Western Samaria. This 150 m long section includes passages and chambers with important Chalcolithic and Bronze Age finds, periods followed by the sealing of this section. Another breakthrough occurred in cave mapping techniques. For example, Araq Naasane, an eastern Samaria cave, measured in the early caving days 310 m long, was re-measured in 2010 by Boaz Langford and Mika Ulman to be 1150 m long. The various developments have led the CRC to a new survey of all long limestone caves. After two years, the updated list is presented here.

Of the ten longest caves, nine are within the geographic regions of Judea and Samaria, and only one in the Galilee. The Judean Desert (including the desert margins) is still leading the list, with six out of the ten caves. While in 1983 only one limestone cave was over half a kilometer long, today the ten longest caves are all over half a kilometer. Most of the caves are hypogenic in origin.

Mapping and Predicting Sinkholes by Integration of Active Remote Sensing and Spectroscopy

Ilan Azaria, Naftaly Goldshlager and Uri Basson

The Dead Sea coastal area is exposed to a destructive process due to the phenomenon of sinkhole collapse. The increase in sinkhole activity in the last two decades has been substantial, resulting from the continuous decrease in sea level. During this period, more than 1000 sinkholes have developed as a result of upper layer collapse. Large sinkholes can reach up to 25 m. The sinkholes are concentrated mainly in clusters in several dozen sites with different characteristics, and pose a threat to human life and activities along the shores of the Dead Sea in Israel and Jordan. In this research, methods for mapping, monitoring and predicting sinkholes were developed using a field spectrometer and geophysical ground penetration radar (GPR, FDEM).

The research was conducted in three stages: 1) literature review and data collection 2) mapping regions abundant with sinkholes in various stages and regions vulnerable to sinkholes 3) analyzing the data and translating it into cognitive and accessible scientific information. Field spectrometry enabled a comparison between spectral signatures of soil samples collected near active or progressive sinkholes, and regions without any visual sign of sinkhole occurrence. FDEM and GPR investigation showed that electrical conductivity and soil moisture are higher in regions affected by sinkhole phenomena.
Multi-temporal measurements, over several seasons, allowed monitoring the progress of an ‘embryonic’ sinkhole. Results show that the integration of geophysical methods and soil spectroscopy analysis allows the development of a multidisciplinary approach to this problem.

Preservation of Natural Aquatic Ecosystems by Application of Bottom Coal Ash Based Bioreactor for In Situ Treatment of Anthropogenic Effluents

Yaakov Anker, Mary Tal, Marina Nisenevitsh, Alexander Gimburg and Moshe Inbar

One consequence of global climate change is recharge decrease at subtropical and Mediterranean regions for both the surface and the ground fresh water resources. As a general rule, when the quantity of any given water source is reduced, the level of salination, as well as chemical and biological pollutants, tends to increase resulting in negative feedback and intensification of the problem. The situation is more severe whenever the drainage basin is (a) heavily populated from urban, industrial and agricultural areas, (b) has wide areas of thin or non soil cover and above all (c) has typical karstic structure and morphology. In contrast to streams in humid regions, these latter conditions are typical to many arid and semi-arid regions around the globe. The pollution effect on these latter streams is greater owing to their relative small size and poor dilution capacity. The consequence of this ongoing and increasing anthropogenic pollution is endangerment to biological, chemical and physical indexes of natural aquatic habitats and owing to decrease in fresh water supply availability also to human sustainability. The ecological impact may involve transition of ephemeral (Wadi) streams into intermittent ones with the accompanied biodiversity change or extinction once the pollution is extreme. The impact on indigenous human communities might be as severe owing to problems of drinking water quality and consequent quantity as well as damage to dry-land farming.

In setting of operations applied to the Yarkon Taninim watershed (central Israel) management, a pilot bio-filter facility for sustainable preservation and rehabilitation of natural fluvial ecosystems was tested. This bio-filter is planned to operate through low impact concept assimilating natural treatment processes occurring during runoff recharge through a porous flow media. The facility is constructed out of several grain sizes of bottom coal ash aggregate, which was found to be a better microbial mats growing stratum, compared
to common natural aggregates such as tuff and lime pebbles (and also has an EPA directive for wastewater treatment).

The bio-filter is operating with initial horizontal flow and continuous vertical circulation through aeration apparatus. Along the flow path several different bio-modules are applied, the sequence consists of aerobic and anaerobic stages, as well as biomass preservation section and fine grain filtration. The pilot bio-filter facility was built during the summer of 2009; the influent consisted of domestic wastewater (of the adjacent Ariel University dormitories) and also synthetic aquatic solutions equivalent to urban, industrial, and roads runoff effluents. The bio-filter operation evaluation demonstrated significant decrease in pollution loads, including organic, salts and pathogens. The facility’s efficiency reached approximately 90% reduction or more, allowing the release of treated runoff without limitation to natural fluvial ecosystems (according to the required regulations). The present stage in the project is implementation of the method and process by application of a full scale pilot facility at a joint between an anthropogenic drainage network, consisting of urban, industrial and motorway runoff collection systems and a typical natural Samaritan fluvial ecosystem. The purpose of the system is to treat these anthropogenic effluents prior to their release into the stream and by that to prevent the negative environmental above mentioned effects.

**Egyptian Balsam and its Use in the Jordan Rift Region**

*Zohar Amar and Orit Shamir*

Egyptian balsam or the zachum oil tree (Balanites aegyptiaca) grows in hot places in the desert oases along the Jordan Rift. This article reviews its use in ancient times, particularly use of the oil produced from it for medicine and spices. Later traditions identified it erroneously with the tsori ha-gilad mentioned in the Bible.

Many samples of residue from Egyptian balsam have been found in botanic-archaeological finding at numerous sites of ancient Egyptian graves; this substance was dedicated as gifts to the gods and to the dead. Residue was also uncovered in sites from various historical periods in Israel in the Judean desert caves, Qumran, Masada, Ein Gedi, as well as at several sites in the Negev.

A unique finding was made at Kasr al-Yahud (near the Monastery of St. John in the Wilderness) which served as both a monastery and a healing site for lepers during the Byzantine period and the early Arab period. Seeds of the fruit were found alongside skeletons of the lepers treated there and these seeds were apparently of Egyptian origin. This might indicate the continued
preservation of the ancient tradition which sees Egyptian balsam as a symbol of eternal life. Another possibility is that the fruit was used because of its extraordinary medicinal properties associated with curative therapy for severe skin diseases, leprosy, joint pains, and paralysis.

Renewal of Persimmon production, Commiphora gileadensis, L. Opobalsamum in Israel: Anti-Cancer Activity

Shimshon Ben-Yehoshua, Rivki Ofir, Shimon Rachmilevitch, Eitan Amiel, Elaine Solowey and Nativ Dudai

The Biblical Balm of Gilead, known also as the Judean balsam, or persimmon, Commiphora gileadensis, L. opobalsamum, was cultivated as an agricultural crop in antiquity only around the Dead Sea Basin and achieved fame on account of its highly reputed aroma and medical properties. It became extinct in this area around the 6th century CE. The resin of this crop was sold, by weight, at a price twice that of gold, the highest price ever paid for an agricultural commodity. The balm of Gilead was produced in Judea for over 1,000 years.

Thanks to the efforts of several good friends and pioneers from several sites, hundreds of these plants now grow in Israel. We found that leaf extract and the resin of these persimmon plants exhibited high activity against several cancer cells by induction of apoptosis. The purpose of this project is to revive the growth of this plant for the purpose of extracting specific compounds to fight cancer as well as for other possible other objectives.

The results obtained from ethanol based extracts indicated that $\beta$- Caryophyllene (trans-(1R,9S)-8-Methylene-4,11,11-trimethylbicyclo[7.2.0] undec-4-ene) is a key component in the essential oil extracted from the balm of Gilead. This compound eliminated 90% of several cancer cells by inducing apoptosis of the cancer cells without affecting the normal cells of normal human fibroblast cells.
'Opinion survey on the subject of settlements in Judea and Samaria' is an index done over a long period of time that is intended to methodically follow the current positions among the Jewish country's citizens who live within the green line, in relation to issues connected to the Israeli presence beyond it. The index is particularly intended to track:
A. The settlements – the public positions concerning the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria.
B. The settlers – the public positions concerning the Jewish settlers in Judea and Samaria.
C. The Palestinian nation – public positions concerning possible solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in Judea and Samaria and generally concerning the idea of 'two people two nations'.
D. Government policies – public stands in relation to government measures that have been taken in relation to Judea and Samaria, as well as the relationship between the Israeli government, the American government and the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria.

The index is intended to create a temporary and up to date data base of all that is connected with Israeli public opinion in relation to the Judea and Samaria region, the region found at the top of the social and political processes agenda in the State of Israel. The index is carried out once a year and its findings are available on a chronological-comparative basis to the general public and to decision makers, researchers and students of research in particular. The findings of the index are published yearly in the 'Book of Judea and Samaria Research' and are presented at the 'Judea and Samaria Research Convention' that takes place at the Ariel University Center in Samaria.

The academic responsibility for the index belongs to Dr. Miriam Billig and Dr. Udi Lebel, at the Research and Development Centre of Samaria and the Jordan Valley Region, and the survey was carrying out by the company Brain Repository, Interdisciplinary Research and Consultation Institute Ltd., headed by Professor Itzhak Katz. The survey was carried out by means of a
structured interview among a probability sample of 527 people who answered the interview questions, constituting a representative sample of the adult Jewish population (from the age of 18 upwards) within the green line only (not including Judea and Samaria territories), among them 50% men and 50% women. The average age of participants was 43. From the respondents in general, 19% are new immigrants, 13% are from the Jewish Orthodox sector, and 68% are from the general Jewish population. The sampling error in relation to the different estimations is 4.5% with a confidence level of 95%.

The decision to focus on the Jewish inhabitants of the state, who live outside the boundaries of the green line, is to study the changes in public opinion amongst those who are not defined as a captive audience that is mostly characterized as having a stable and unchanging stand in relation to the Jewish settlement of Judea and Samaria. In this connection the non-fluctuating opinions of Arab Israelis are characterized by objection to the Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria, and the Jewish inhabitants of Judea and Samaria express a constant support for the settlement enterprise of which they are a part.

The index was held for the first time in June 2009, and the survey was repeated once a year. The survey which is the basis for this article was carried out between the dates May 15-25, 2012.

In order to verify that the respondents were not among the inhabitants of the area, a screening question was asked pre-dating the carrying out of the interview: "Do you live in the Judea and Samaria area?" Jewish respondents who answered "I do not live in the Judea and Samaria area" were given a full interview. The remainder were screened out and not interviewed at all.

It must be pointed out that the opinions that emerge from the survey reflect the public opinion at the time they were examined, and at most, subjective impressions can be learned from the public that was influenced, as it is always influenced, by a range of factors: media coverage, personal ideology, the stands of decision makers, opinion writers and so forth. Suitable use of the findings of a public opinion poll will be executed in a comparative manner by examining the results of a yearly sample from the year before and after it. In this way it is possible to learn about the fluctuations that take place in public opinion in relation to the issues of Judea and Samaria.

Summary of findings 2012
1. Most respondents agree that Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria is a true Zionist act (64%) and is the security belt for the country (57%). Both of these parameters show a moderate increase as compared to 2011.
2. Most respondents do not agree that the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria are illegal settlements (62%), the source of conflict with the
Palestinians (56%) or a waste of the state's money (60%). These findings were similar to those of 2011.

3. Most respondents agree that the Jewish inhabitants – the settlers in Judea and Samaria, are like all other Israeli citizens (69%), the real Zionists (57%), and the parapet for the nation (51%). There was a moderate increase in these parameters as compared to 2011.

4. Most of the respondents do not agree that the Jewish inhabitants (the settlers) of Judea and Samaria extort funds (70%), are the source of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (64%), are hooligans (62%) or are an impediment to peace (65%). In most of these parameters there was a moderate increase as compared to 2011.

5. About a third (29%) of respondents think that the settlers in Judea and Samaria are represented in a real way by religious Zionists who serve in the military. About one third of the respondents (33%) think that the settlers in Judea and Samaria are represented in a real way by the following factors: the religious Zionists, the heads of the Judea and Samaria council, right wing parties, the leaders of the settlements in Judea and Samaria, the rabbis in Judea and Samaria and the "hilltop youth".

6. Many opinion holders (45%) support the Israeli withdrawal (either partial or complete) from Judea and Samaria, within the framework of a peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority. About a third (36%) support the annexation (either partial or complete) of the Judea and Samaria territory, and less than a fifth (14%) support the continuation of the status quo. A minor proportion of respondents (5%) support unilateral Israeli retreat (partial or complete) without any agreement with the Palestinians. These findings remained stable with no significant changes in comparison to previous surveys.

7. The most influential factors effecting public opinion in regards to what the desired solution in Judea and Samaria should be are: (a) Qassam rockets fired from Gaza on the southern towns (48%), (b) the condition of the people who were uprooted from Gush Katif (48%), (c) the take-over of Hamas in Gaza (43%), (d) the increase of settlers who serve as combatants in the military (41%). The launching of Qassams from Gaza on the southern towns continues to be the most influential factor effecting public opinion in this regard, from 2009 until present.

8. The least influential factors on public opinion in regard to what the desired solution in Judea and Samaria should be are: (a) the Iranian threat (75%), (b) the position of the American government lead by Obama (53%), (c) the chance to achieve a peace agreement with the Arab states (51%), (d) the opinions and declarations of the Palestinian Authority (54%). These
finding were stable as compared to 2011.

9. The great majority of opinion holders (78%) (in comparison to 70% in 2009, 73% in 2010, and 72% in 2011) are not willing to accept any kind of removal, or is willing to accept the removal of isolated illegal settlements or only a small number of legal towns and settlements in exchange for an end to the conflict with the Palestinians and a full peace. In this aspect, there appear to be signs indicating a moderate increase over time in unwillingness to accept large-scale relocations.

10. The rate of those who are willing to clear a large number of settlements/towns or all of the Jewish towns in Judea and Samaria increased from 14% in 2011, to 22% in the present survey.

11. A large majority of respondents (63%) do not accept the concept that the Jewish settlements of Judea and Samaria will remain in place after an IDF retreat from the area. 37% are willing to accept that Jewish settlement will remain in place after an IDF retreat from the area. These findings remained unchanged in comparison to 2011.

12. A large majority of respondents (73%) think that Isralei acceptance of the two-state solution will not do anything for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or will prevent its exacerbation for a short time only (in comparison to 74% in 2009, 71% in 2010, and 64% in 2011).

13. 11% of respondents believe that accepting the two-state solution by Israel will bring about the end of the conflict (as compared to 16% in 2011). About a third of respondents (36%), believe that accepting the two-state solution by Israel will prevent the exacerbation of the conflict for a long period, or will end it (26% in 2009, 29% 2010, and 36% in 2011).

14. The Jewish public believes that the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, including an Israeli retreat behind the 1967 boarders, should be clearly dependent on the following conditions (in descending order, based on responses graded on a scale from 1-5):
   a. Palestinian commitment to the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (4.34)
   b. Military presence in the Jordan Valley (4.17%)
   c. Ensuring the ability of Jewish Israeli’s to enter their holy places that will be returned to Palestinian control (4.09)
   d. United Jerusalem under Israeli jurisdiction (4.04)
   E. Official and public Palestinian declaration acknowledging Israel as the state of the Jewish people (4.02)

15. The Jewish public believe that the peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians, including Israeli retreat behind 1967 boarders, should not be dependent on the following conditions (based on responses graded from 1-5):
a. Palestinian willingness to leave Jewish settlements under their control (2.62)
b. Transferring the jurisdiction over Arab settlements in Israel to the Palestinian state as a solution to the demographic problem (2.91)

16. Most respondents (72%) (in comparison to 60% in 2009, 67% in 2010, and 62% in 2011) think that the Jewish inhabitants (settlers) of Judea and Samaria, will moderately or greatly succeed in influencing the decisions of Netanyahu's government in relation to the future of the settlements in Judea and Samaria. In this aspect, there appears to be a moderate increase over time, representing a higher estimation of the ability of the settlers to influence the government.

17. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is being judged by the large majority of the Jewish public (72%) as a national-religious conflict over the legitimization of the existence of a Jewish state and not as a territorial conflict over the 1967 boarders (69% do not agree to the statement that the conflict is territorial). These finding represent similar opinions as published in the previous survey of 2011.

18. A large majority of respondents (64%) support the continuation of settlements in Samaria (either continuing settling in any location, or focusing efforts on strengthening settlements blocs), while a third of respondents (36%) support a temporary freezing or total cessation of building in Samaria. These findings remained stable as compared to 2011.

19. A third of respondents (39%) perceive the behavior of Netanyahu's government toward the settlers in Judea and Samaria at the time of the survey as appropriate behavior, not too tough and not too soft. A third of respondents (32%) think that his behavior is too soft, and 29% think that the behavior is too tough.

20. The Jewish public continues to be divided in its trust on the government's decision-making in regards to the future of Judea and Samaria: About half of respondents (54%) trust (moderately or above) in the government of Israel to succeed in reaching the right decisions regarding the future of the settlements in Judea and Samaria, while about half (46%) do not trust the Israeli government's decision on this subject. These finding remained stable in comparison to 2011.

21. The majority of respondents (56%) think that the Judea and Samaria settlers do damage to the relationship between the Israeli and American governments. About a third (32%) think that the settlers do not influence Israel-American relations, and only 12% think that the settlers contribute to Israeli-American relations. These finding remained stable in comparison to 2011.
22. Half of respondents (50%) think that Prime Minister Netanyahu succeeded in positively influencing the policy of American President Barak Obama in regards to the future of the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, while 50% think that Netanyahu did not succeed in this regard.

23. Most of the Jewish public think that Binyamin Netanyahu is the right person to sign a peace treaty with the Palestinians: most of the respondents (58%) think that Netanyahu is the right man to conduct negotiations with the Palestinians and to sign a peace agreement with them, as opposed to 42% who think that Netanyahu is not the right person for this job.

24. Most respondents think that at this time the settler leadership should start a campaign to connect with the Israeli public in order sway public opinion and thereby influence the Prime Minister (29%), while fighting tooth and nail against the "hilltop youth" and the Jewish law breakers in Judea and Samaria (22%).

25. The major factors that prevent the public from identify with the settlers in Judea and Samaria are:
   a. the "hilltop youth" (46% of respondents claim a lack of identification with settlers for this reason)
   b. the religious radicalization in the judgments passed by the Rabbis from Judea and Samaria in regard to women (41% of respondents claim a lack of identification with settlers for this reason)

26. Positions on settlements, settlers, preferred solutions with regard to Judea and Samaria and towards Israeli policy with regard to Judea and Samaria are usually significantly connected to the frequency of visits to Judea and Samaria, and to the political and religious tendencies of the respondents. These finding represent similar opinions as published in the previous survey of 2011.
A. Israeli public opinion regarding the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria

Figure 1: Extent of agreement to statements about the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, Comparison between 2009-2012

As shown in Figure 1 above, the perception of the majority of the Jewish public towards the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria is becoming more supportive. The 2012 survey registered the most significant increase in public support concerning issues connected with Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria since the index was first compiled in 2009. This is expressed particularly in a decrease in the numbers of those who view the settlements as the international court, which has declared all settlement activity illegal; and a reduction to the lowest level since 2009 in the number of respondents who view the settlements as a waste of state resources. In addition, there is a peak in the percentage of those who see the settlements as a national security resource, and perceive it as the security belt of the state; there is also a peak in the percentage of those who view the settlements as a moral-ideological expression, considering it as a real act of Zionism. In regard to the concept that the Jewish settlement of Judea and Samaria is the main cause of the Palestinian conflict – the data is stable, showing that about one quarter of the Jewish population agrees with this statement. There is major interest
in the analysis of this data, since during the last election campaign, (which took place in Israel a few months after this index was complied) was focused mainly on national social-economic issues, while de-emphasizing issues of international affairs and defense. From the results above it can be understood that even those who voted for parties that are not significantly identified with defense or international affairs, the majority are positively inclined towards the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria.

B. Israeli public opinion regarding Jewish settlers in Judea and Samaria

**Figure 2: Extent of agreement with statements about the settlers in Judea and Samaria. Comparison between 2009-2012**

As can be seen in Figure 2, the Israeli public expresses empathic and positive sentiments towards the settler population. This year in particular, can be seen the highest level of support and empathy expressed for the settlers since the beginning of the compilation of this index. A limited and stable percentage of respondents perceive the settlers as an obstacle to peace and the source of the conflict with the Palestinians, law-breakers or money extortions. However, there was an increase in respondents who identify with the settlers, a peak in the number of people that see in the civilian settlers as any other Israeli civilian (69%) and perceive them as true Zionist (57%). The perception of the settlers as being reviled by the general Israeli public, created by their
negative portrayal in a variety of academic publications, during the uprooting from Gush Katif (2005) as well as the general bias in the Israeli media – is counteracted by the findings of this survey, as is demonstrated in this figure. Indeed, the wider Israeli public sees them as a group that is to be cherished rather than villainized.

**Figure 3: Perceived representatives of the settlers in Judea and Samaria, 2009-2012**

![Figure 3: Perceived representatives of the settlers in Judea and Samaria, 2009-2012](image)

Figure 3 shows that the perceived representative of the settlers is actually a negotiator who is responsible for the public sentiment towards them, and whose public standing is directly related to theirs. Changes and developments in the perception of who represent the settlers are of particular interest because of their influence on public opinion with regard to the settlers, leading to a corresponding increase or decrease of public support. The survey of 2012 reveals trends that can only be interpreted as beneficial to the settlers and settlements image as was described in the last two figures. A significant reduction can be observed in the identification of the rabbis and the hilltop youth as representative of the settler public. In contrast, most of the general public perceives members of the religious Zionists that serve as combatants in the military as representative of the settler public. In contrast, most of the general public perceives members of the religious Zionists that serve as combatants in the military as representative of the settler movement, five times more so than the leaders of the Judea and Samaria council, the right wing parties or the heads of the settlements. These data clarifying why there is a rise in positive attitudes towards the settler population. As a society that highly regards
military service and rejects political de-legalization and religious/ideological, the settler public is benefiting from the developments described in the above figure.

C. Public opinion in relation to possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Figure 4: Opinions on the desired solution in Judea and Samaria, Comparison between 2009-2011 and 2012 surveys
From figures 4 and 5 it is possible to see a significant trend towards hawkish attitudes within the Jewish society in Israel. There was an increase as never before registered since the beginning of the compilation of this index, in the number of supporters for complete annexation of all the territories and a stable reduction in the willingness to support solutions that contain Israeli territorial retreats, either unilaterally or bi-laterally. However, it should be noted that there is an increase in the dissatisfaction, although moderate, with the status quo as well.
Figure 6: Opinions about removing settlements in the Judea and Samaria territories Comparison between 2009-2011 and 2012 surveys

Figure 6 shows that you have to be careful when interpreting the data detailed in the previous figures. Even though there is an increase in empathy towards settlers and the settlement movement within the general Israeli public, as well as a reduction in support of territorial retreat, there is also however, an increase in those who are willing to evacuate isolated settlements, and an increase in the willingness to evacuate a small number of legal settlements. The number of respondents who resist any evacuation (less than half of the Israeli public) is relatively stable. It is important to note a reduction in the number of those willing to evacuate a large number of settlements and an increase in those willing to evacuate all of the settlements of Judea and Samaria. The impression is that of a hawkish public that resists the idea of intensive settlement evacuation, but this does not imply the total rejection of the option of evacuating limited numbers of settlements in the framework of future peace agreements.
Table 1: A comparison of the survey of 2012 to the surveys of 2009 -2011, according to an average grade of the total sample

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<th>Factor</th>
<th>Difference#</th>
<th>Average grade per survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Iranian threat</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes and declarations of the Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take-over by Hamas in Gaza</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firing of Qassam rockets from Gaza into southern Israel</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The position of the American government lead by President Obama</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The increase in the number of settler sons that serve as combatants in the army</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme attitudes among settlers (hilltop youth, rabbis)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The socio-economic condition of the uprooted settlers of Gush Katif</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The chance to achieve a peace treaty with the Palestinians</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The chance to achieve a peace treaty with the Arab nations</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Arabic take-over of land in the Negev and the Galilee</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Nakba Discussion&quot; – the aspiration of the Palestinians to go back to the borders of 1948</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# The difference between the current and the former survey.
* In the 2011 survey the question was phrased: "Would a united Fatah-Hamas government" influence your position relating to the desired solution in Judea and Samaria.

In table 1 it can be seen which factors most greatly influence Israeli public opinion towards the settlement movement and the settlers themselves, and towards a desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The firing of qassam rockets at the southern settlements in Israel from The Gaza Strip has had the greatest influence on these parameters. Seven years after the uprooting of the Gush Katif settlements, with its disappointing outcome in terms of its defense implications, it is the most dramatic and formative experience that informs the Israeli political psychology, in all that pertains to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to this, there are two other factors that are connected to the uprooting of Gush Katif effecting public opinion; the Hamas take-over in Gaza, and the social-economic condition of the evacuated settlers. It is apparent that the Israeli public is examining the Israeli-Palestinian
situation very rationally, and was dramatically affected by the evacuation of Gush Katif.

**D. The settlers and public policy design**

**Table 2: The ability of the settlers to influence governmental decisions about the future of the Judea and Samaria settlements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. No success</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A minor success</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A moderate success</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A great success</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A huge Success</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Don't know / other answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (scale 1 – 5)</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: Evaluating the behavior of the government towards the Judea and Samaria settlers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Survey 2011</th>
<th></th>
<th>Survey 2012</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Too soft</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. In a proper degree</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Too stern</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Don't know / other answers</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: The influence of the settlers over the relationships between the government of Israel and the American government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Survey 2011</th>
<th>Survey 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>holders</td>
<td>holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Harming the relations</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No influence</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Contributing</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Don't know / other answers</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 2 and 3 show the perception of the general public towards settler influence on Israeli public policy. A significant increase can be seen in 2012 as compared to previous year's surveys, in the Israeli public assessment of the ability of the settlers to influence the design of public policy. In addition, it should be noted that in correlation to greater empathy felt for the settler movement as mentioned in the beginning of this index, there is also an increase in the perception that the Israeli government's attitude towards the settlers as too tough, and a reduction in the number of those who see the government's attitude towards the settlers as "in right measure". It can be see that the positive perceptions held by the general public towards the settlers is translated into expectations of a similar attitude from decision makers and policy designers. Criticism towards the settlers from the general public is decreasing, which is expressed in the reduction of those who perceive them as sabotaging the relationship between Israel and the Americans (table 4).
E. Evaluation of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu

Table 5: Evaluation of the success of the Prime Minister in positively influencing the policy of President Obama regarding the future of the Jewish settlements in the area of Judea and Samaria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Survey 2012</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Will not</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. More or less</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Will do</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Don't know / other answers</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Evaluation of the Prime Minister as the right person to negotiate with the Palestinians and sign a peace treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Survey 2011</th>
<th></th>
<th>Survey 2012</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. No</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Don't know / other</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In regard to the willingness to support a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as seen in figure 7, there is a consistent increase in support of non-negotiable preconditions from the Israeli public. In all the parameters detailed in the figure, there was an increase among those who supported the precondition: to transfer the jurisdiction of Arab settlements in Israel to the Palestinian state; agreement with the Palestinian authority to leave Jewish settlements under their jurisdiction; promising Jewish accessibility to the holy places that will fall under Palestinian jurisdiction; removing Hamas from the Palestinian government; Palestinian recognition of Israel as the national state of the Jewish people; Palestinian agreement to an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley; leaving Jerusalem as the united capital of Israel, and in keeping the Jewish settlement blocs under Israeli jurisdiction. The highest increase seen as a precondition to any peace treaty is a Palestinian commitment to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In summary, Israeli public opinion is becoming significantly more rigid and more hawkish in all
regards to its expectations and preconditions to future agreements with the Palestinians.

Table 7: The level of agreement with the statement that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a territorial conflict over the 1967 border

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Survey 2011</th>
<th>Survey 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Do not agree at all</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do not agree</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. So-so</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Agree</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Agree very much</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Don’t know and other</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (scale 1 - 5)</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: The level of agreement with the statement that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a national-religious conflict over the legitimization of the existence of a Jewish state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Survey 2011</th>
<th>Survey 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Do not agree at all</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do not agree</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. So-so</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Agree</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Agree very much</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Don’t know and other</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (scale 1 - 5)</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From tables 7 and 8 it can be seen that there was an significant increase among Israelis that do not agree with the statement that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a territorial conflict over the 1967 border, while the opinion that it is a national-religious conflict over the legitimization of the existence of a Jewish state was stable as compared to previous years.
Table 9: The steps the leadership of the settlers in Judea and Samaria need to take now

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Survey 2012#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Initiate a political plan regarding Judea and Samaria</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fight definitively against the hilltop youth and Jewish law-breakers in Judea and Samaria</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Set out on a journey of reconnection with the Israeli public in order to influence public opinion and with it the Prime Minister</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Set out on a campaign that will force a referendum before signing any peace treaty with the Palestinians.</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Become a big bloc within the Likud party</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Become a significant part of the social protest movement in the upcoming summer</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Do not know/other</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# This question was first presented in the 2012 survey, and did not appear in the other surveys

Table 10: The factors that prevent the general public from identifying with settlers in Judea and Samaria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>6 Not know, other answers</th>
<th>5 Greatly prevents identification</th>
<th>4 Prevents identification</th>
<th>3 Some what prevents identification</th>
<th>2 Does not prevent identification</th>
<th>1 Does not prevent identification at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hilltop youth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the fact that most settlers are religious</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the religious radicalization in the verdicts of the rabbis of Judea and Samaria regarding women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. the intolerance of the settlers to other minorities, such as Arabs and homosexuals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. the attempt of settlers to impose their religion on the army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. the persistence of the settlers not to evacuate illegal outposts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11: Grading the factors that prevent identification with the settlers of Judea and Samaria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of Reasons</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Does not prevent identification</th>
<th>So-so</th>
<th>Prevents identification</th>
<th>Other answers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hilltop youth</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the religious radicalization in the verdicts of the rabbis of Judea and Samaria regarding women</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the attempt of settlers to impose their religion on the army</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. the persistence of the settlers not to evacuate illegal outposts</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. the intolerance of the settlers to other minorities, such as Arabs and homosexuals</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. the fact that most settlers are religious</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: The policy that Israel needs to adopt in Samaria at this time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Survey 2011</th>
<th>Survey 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Opinion holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Continue building as many settlements as possible, in all areas</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Focus settlement efforts by concentrating settlements in large blocs</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Temporarily freeze settlement activity during periods of negotiation</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Completely freeze building in Samaria</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other answers</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems the Israeli public has stayed more or less stable in its perception of the issues that are detail in the above tables.