Speaker: Prof. Sophie Bade, Department of Economics,Royal Holloway College, University of London, United Kingdom
Time: 12:00 – 13:00
Place: Building #3A, lower conference room, floor 2 (floor 1 in the elevator), Ariel University, Ariel
Consider a matching problem where agents and objects arrive over time. Assume matchmaking has to start before all agents’ preferences become known: the decision on who works which shift in the current month cannot be based on the preferences of agents who are set to work next year. To capture this ongoing nature I model the sets of agents and shifts as countably infinite. Each agent must work within a finite time window around the shift he was endowed with. Shift exchange problems are ongoing versions of housing markets as defined by Shapley and Scarf  and much of the theory for housing markets transfers. However any Pareto optimal, strategy proof and individually rational mechanism must elicit infinitely many preferences to match any finite subset of agents. To overcome this flaw I suggest two alternative individually rational mechanisms with reasonably weakened welfare and incentive properties.
Sophie did her Ph.D. at NYU with Efe Ok in 2004. Since then she worked at Penn State, the Max Planck Institut in Bonn and at Royal Holloway in London. Her two main fields are decision theory and mechanism design with particular focus on ambiguity aversion in the former and matching in the latter.