- אירוע כבר עבר.
ינואר 21 @ 12:00 pm - 1:00 pm
Speaker: Prof. David Sarne, Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University
Time: 12:00 – 13:00
Place: Building #3A, lower conference room, floor 2 (floor 1 in the elevator), Ariel University, Ariel
The focus of the talk is a “simple” contest where participation is costly and the quality of participants’ contributions is a priori uncertain at the time they make their decision related to participating in the contest. The proper design of this type of contest has become increasingly important especially in the context of crowdsourcing and online contests. I will present a comparative game-theoretic based solution to two variants of the above underlying model: parallel and sequential contest, enabling characterization of the equilibrium strategies in each. The analysis will be followed with a demonstration of several (somehow counter-intuitive) properties of the equilibrium, in particular for the sequential contest, leading to a comprehensive characterization of the principal preference between the two. I will also deal with the question of prize allocation, demonstrating not only that a multi-prize structure is often beneficial but also that in some cases the principal’s expected profit is maximized when offering a second prize greater than the first prize. Finally, I will present results of experiments aiming to analyze the phenomena of over-participation in such contests, when the agents are bounded-rational.
David Sarne is an Associate Professor in the Department of Computer Science at Bar-Ilan University. He is also the head of the Intelligent Information Agents (IIA) group. He joined Bar-Ilan in Oct. 2007; before this, he was a Post-Doc at Harvard University for two years, following several years in the Israeli hi-tech industry. He holds a B.Sc. in Industrial Engineering and an M.Sc. in Information Systems (both from Tel-Aviv University) and a Ph.D. in Computer Science from Bar-Ilan University.